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OBSCENITY

OBSCENITY: A QUICK LOOK AT STANLEY v. GEORGIA
Prior to Mr. Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Stanley
v. Georgia,' the United States Supreme Court had consistently
ruled that obscenity was unprotected by the first amendment's unconditional coverage of speech and press. 2 Stanley
enervates this dogma by stretching the first amendment beyond it's traditional proportions to insulate the individual's
right to possess obscenity.3
Federal and state agents entered Stanley's home armed
with a valid search warrant particularly describing certain
1 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
2 The leading case is Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
485 (1957) ("We hold that obscenity is not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech or press."). The exclusion doctrine was reaffirmed in Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 641 (1968) ("[O]bscenity is not protected expression
and may be suppressed without a showing of the circumstances which lie behind the phrase 'clear and present danger' in its application to protected speech.") (Citation omitted.). In addition to obscenity, the exclusion doctrine has
also been applied to "fighting words" [Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) ("Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate that the appellations 'damned racketeer' and 'damned Fascist' are epithets likely to provoke
the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach
of the peace.").] and libelous utterances [Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) ("Libelous utterances not being
within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is
unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to consider
the issues behind the phrase 'clear and present danger.'").].
3 As applied to speech, the traditional purpose of the first
amendment is "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957) (Emphasis added.). Seemingly, the holding in
Stanley expands the purpose of the first amendment to
embrace the dignity of man purely in his capacity as an
individual. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
FIRST AiEN
NT 4 (1st ed. 1963).
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paraphernalia used in the bookmaking profession. The search
revealed three reels of obscene film. Stanley was arrested
for and subsequently convicted of "knowingly hav[ing] possession of . . . obscene matter" in violation of Georgia law.4
Affirming, 5 the Supreme Court of Georgia held that "it [was]
not essential to an indictment charging one with possession of
obscene matter that it be alleged that such possession was
'with intent to sell, expose or circulate'the same'."0 The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the first and
fourteenth amendments prohibit making private possession
of obscenity a crime.7
The United States Supreme Court, in A Book Named
"John Cleland'sMemoirs of a Woman of Pleasure"v. Attorney
General of Massachusetts,8 held that ribaldry is vulnerable
to censorship if "(a) the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b)
the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description
4 GA.

CODE

ANN. § 26-6301 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1968),

which reads in relevant part:
Any person who shall ... knowingly have possession of
...

any obscene matter.., shall, if such person has knowl-

edge or reasonably should know of the obscene nature of
such matter, be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than five years....
5 Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 259, 161 S.E.2d 309 (1968), rev'd
sub nom. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
6 Id. at 261, 161 S.E.2d at 311.
7 394 U.S. at 568. Mr. Justice Black, citing his concurrence
in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959) and his
dissent in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966)
as examples of his position, concurred on his usual ground
that all anti-obscenity legislation violates the first amendment. Relying on Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192,
196 (1927), Justices Stewart, Brennan and White concurred,
reasoning that the Stanley search violatated the particularity requirement of the fourth amendment.
8 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is
utterly without redeeming social value."9 At present, the
Memoirs formula remains the prevailing definition of obscenity.10 However, two recent decisions, Redrup v New York"
and Stanley v. Georgia, 2 indicate that the Court is experimenting with a replacement for the traditional definitional
approach to obscenity analysis.
9 Id. at 418. Basically, the Memoirs formula combines the
Roth definition with subsequent decisions. In addition,
Memoirs clarified the question of whether the lack of
social value is an independent element of obscenity. See
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 486 (1962)
(Obscene material must be both "patently offensive" and
appealing to a "prurient interest" before it can be constitutionally prescribed.); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193
(1964) (The phrase "contemporary community standards"
implies a national rather than a local test.); Mishkin v.
New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509 (1966) (When material is
intended for a "clearly defined deviant sexual group," the
*prurientappeal element is measured by the standards of that
group.). The Memoirs formula was reiterated in Redrup
v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1967).
10 Mr. Justice Stewart, however, subscribes to a more stringent definition, i.e., "hard core pornography." Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463, 499 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
The most graphic definition of "hard core pornography"
was given by Judge Fuld in People v. Richmond County
News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 587, 175 N.E.2d 681, 686, 216 N.Y.S.
2d 369, 376 (1961) (Citation omitted.):
It [hard core pornography] focuses predominantly upon
what is sexually morbid, grossly perverse and bizarre,
without any artistic or scientific purpose or justification.
Recognizable 'by the insult it offers, invariably, to sex,
and to the human spirit' .. ., it is to be differentiated from
the bawdy and the ribald. Depicting dirt for dirt's sake,
the obscene is the vile, rather than the course, the blow
to sense, not merely to sensibilty. It smacks, at times, of
fantasy and unreality, of sexual perversion and sickness
and represents . . . 'a debauchery of the sexual faculty.'
11 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
12 394 U.S. 557 (1969).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1969

3

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 6 [1969], Iss. 3, Art. 8

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6, No. 3

The law of obscenity has matured in three barely visible
phases. In the initial phase, the question was whether the
challenged material satisfied the elements of obscenity, not
whether the speech in question jeopardized a valid community
interest. Under the baneful influence of Roth v. United
States,13 the Court utilized a definitional or per se methodol14
ogy to detect the presence of obscenity in noxious literature.
While earlier decisions, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire"5 and
Beauharnaisv. Illinois,16 concocted the egregious doctrine that
only ideas of social importance are eligible for first amendment immunity, Roth applied this exclusion doctrine directly
to obscenity. 17 The Roth Court concluded that obscenity is
utterly devoid of ideological content and therefore unqualified for constitutional protection under the aberrant Chaplinsky-Beauharnais exclusion doctrine. This enabled the Court
to fashion a definitional approach to the problem of obscen13 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
14 Monaghan, Obscenity, 1966:
The Marriage of Obscenity
I Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod, 76 YALE L.J. 127 1966).
15 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (Footnotes omitted.) (fighting
words) ("There are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene. . . . It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social inerest in order and morality.").
1' 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952)
(libelous utterances).
17 354 U.S. at 484 (Footnote omitted.) ("All ideas having even
the slightest redeeming social importance -unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the
quaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon
the limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.").
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ity rather than adopt the more conventional "clear and present
danger"'18 or balancing 19 approach.
Ginzburg v. United States, 20 Mishkin v. New York 2' and
Ginsberg v. New York 22 introduced the second phase in the
evolution of obscenity law. Here, a new rubric emerged to
supplement the traditional per se methodology in cases where
social value vel non was marginal. The new approach -variously labeled "obscenity per quod,"23 "contextual obscenity"2 4
and "variable obscenity" 25 - imputes a finding of obscenity to
nonobscene material if it is marketed in an obtrusive and
offensive manner. 26 Under this approach, obscenity becomes
a variable, dependent on the book's content and the defendSchenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The
question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.").
See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927)
(Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring) (Added the requirement that the danger be "imminent."); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Overruling Whitney.).
19 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951), quoting,
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950),
affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (" 'In each case [courts] must
ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger.'").

18

20
21
22

383 U.S. 463 (1966).
383 U.S. 502 (1966).
390 U.S. 629 (1968).

Monaghan, supra note 14.
Semonche, Definitional and Contextual Obscenity: The Supreme Court's New and Disturbing Accommodation, 13
U.C.L.A. REv. 1173 (1966).
25 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing ConstitutionalStandards,45 Mn=. L. REV. 5 (1960).
20 See Morreale, Obscenity: An Analysis and Statutory Proposal, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 421.,
23

24
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.ant's conduct. Such aggressive marketing of pornography
is referred to as "pandering." Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking
for the Court in Ginzburg, defined pandering as "'the business of purveying textual or graphic matter openly adver27
tised to appeal to the erotic interest of their customers'.1
Thus, in this phase, the Court did not strictly adhere to a
per se methodology, but also considered per quod factors as
relevent.
Redrup v. New York 28 introduces the third phase in the
development of obscenity law. This phase deadens the influence of the Roth exclusion doctrine by extending limited
constitutional protection to material assumed to be obscene.
In Redrup, the Court, apparently disenchanted with definitions, inflated the pandering theory to protect the commercial transfer of obscenity. In a brief per curiam opinon,
the Court ruled that the traffic of erotica in public commerce
is protected by the first and fourteenth amendments in the
absence of "an assault upon individual privacy by publication
in a manner so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an
unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it."28 Redrup is
an important decision because it indicates that the presence
or absence of pandering, rather than a definitional finding
of obscenity, will control the issue of censorship. 0 The
Court, in Redrup, treated an obscene book as nonobscene
'

28

383 U.S. at 467 (Footnote omitted.), quoting, Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 495-96 (1957) (Warren, C.J., concurring). In Memoirs, the Court opined that "where the
purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative
aspects of his publications, a court could accept his evaluation at its face value." 383 U.S. at 420.
386 U.S. 767 (1967).

29 Id. at 769.
30

But see Milky Way Prods., Inc. v. Leary, 305 F. Supp.
288, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd per curiam, sub nom. New
York Feed Co. v. Leary, 397 U.S. 98 (1970), where a lower
federal court held that pandering is not to be considered
as a fourth element in the Memoirs formula.
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because of the absence of pandering, while the Court in
Ginzburg, Mishkin and Ginsberg treated a nonobscene book
as obscene because of the presence of pandering. In other
words, Redrup, by creating a conditional privilege to sell
obscene publications, enervates the Roth exclusion doctrine.
Stanley continues the trend established in Redrup.
In Stanley, the State, citing Roth, argued that, since
obscenity is not within the area of constituionally protected
speech or press because of its paltry characteristics, the states
are free to deal with the subject in any way they deem necessary.81 Rejecting this contention, the Court ruled that Roth
and its progeny were not dispositive of the Stanley case.
Stanley was not asserting the right to profit from the sale
32
or distribution of obscenity, as in previous obscenity cases,
but "the right to read or observe what he pleases-the right
to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy
of his own home."3 3 The Court reasoned that the right to
receive information,3 4 buttressed by a peripherial right to
privacy,85 erased any similarity between Roth and Stanley.
394 U.S. at 565.
Id. at 561 nn.5 & 6.
83 Id. at 565.
34 The right to receive information was drawn directly from
the first amendment as interpreted in Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); accord, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("[T]he State may
not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment,
contract the spectrum of available knowledge."). See also
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507, 510 (1948) (The right to receive information attaches
to information regardless of social value.).
35 Privacy was characterized by Stanley merely as an "added
dimension," intimating that privacy is not an independent
constitutional right. 394 U.S. at 564. But see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-85 (1965) (Mr. Justice Douglas
seemed to imply a general right to privacy from five provisions of the Bill of Rights: the first amendment protection.of the privacy of association [NAACP v. Alabama
31

32
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The doctrine that obscenity is denied first amendment immunization was the product of cases involving public distribution of obscene matter; and, according to Stanley, this
rule is tolerated only because commercial dissemination presents the ubiquitous danger that "obscene material might
fall into the hands of children, . . . or that it might intrude

30
upon the sensibilities or privacy of the general public.1
However, the Stanley films were possessed for private entertainment not for public exploitation. Thus, the possibility
that the mere private possession of obscenity will threaten
the morality of children or offend the sensibilities of an unwilling general public is remote.

Stanley, like Redrup, avoided a definitional approach
by assuming the challenged speech to be obscene and reasoned
that obscenity "cannot, in every context, be insulated from
all constitutional protections.

37

This statement, despite the

Court's protestations to the contrary,3 8 inundates the Roth
exclusion doctrine which unequivocally requires suppression
once the material is branded obscene. This holding allowed
the Court for the first time to examine the social justifications
behind the censorship of obscenity.89
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).]; the third amendment prohibition against quartering soldiers; the fourth
amendment prohibition against illegal searches and seizures;
the fifth amendment privilege against self--incrimination;
and the ninth amendment protection of unenumerated
rights.); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[T]he right to be left alone [is]
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men.").
30 394 U.S. at 567 (Citations and footnote ommitted.).
3

Id. at 563.

38 Id. at 568 ("Roth and the cases following that decision are
not impaired by today's holding.").
-9 Comment, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YAL, L.J. 1364,
1403 (1966). Roth and Stanley are possibly inconsistent for
an additional reason. Roth, discounting the Redrup decision,
proscribes the sale of obscenity, while Stanley acknowl-
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Georgia advanced, and the Court scotched, three traditional arguments in support of sweeping anti-obscenity legislation ° First, Georgia asserted the power to maintain the
moral purity of the community from the corrupting influence
of mildly salacious literature, independent of whether it
stimulates immoral behavior.41 The Court responded to this
contention by asserting that a person's private thoughts are
not the licit subject matter for regulatory legislation.
Whatever the power of the state to control public
dissemination- of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on
the disirability
of controlling a person's p r iv a t e
42
thoughts.
This statement and other references 43 to the privacy of one's
thought process raise an interesting proposition. If the privacy
edges the individual's right to possess obscenity. If the
right to possess obscenity can be construed to include the
right to receive obscenity, it would seem to follow that
statutes proscribing the sale of obscenity would indirectly
burden the right to receive information and therefore be
unconstitutional.
40 See generally Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law
of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295,
373-387; Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity,
1960 Sup. CT. REv. 1; Henkin, Morals and the Constitution:
The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLum. L. REV. 391 (1963);
Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 937 (1963); Slough & McAnany,
Obscenity and Constitutional Freedom, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J.
279 (1964); Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth,
1966 Sup. CT. REV. 7.
41 394 U.S. at 565.
42

Id. at 566.

43

"We are not certain that this argument amounts to anything more than the assertion that the State has the right
to control the moral content of a person's thoughts." 394
U.S. at 565 (Footnote omitted.). "Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the
power to control men's minds." Id.
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aspect of Stanley is interpreted to attach not to some constitutionally protected locus but to an individual's thoughts,
then seemingly legislation drafted around the concept of
"prurient appeal" must be abandoned as an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy.44
Next Georgia contended that there is some rational relation between anti-obscenity legislation and crime prevention,
admittedly a legitimate subject of state concern. 4u The Court
noted the paucity of empirical evidence supporting a connection between the exposure to obscenity and subsequent
illegal conduct 46 and stated:
Given the present state of knowledge, the State may
no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter
on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct
than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on
the ground that they
may lead to the manufacture of
47
homemade spirits.
Finally, Georgia drolled that the prohibition of possession of
obscene material is an indispensable element in statutory
schemes prohibiting distribution. 48 The Court tersely replied
that, "[b]ecause [the] right [to read] is so fundamental
to our scheme of individual liberty, its restriction may not
be justified by the need to ease the administration of other'49
wise valid criminal laws.
Standing alone, Stanley does not leave the institution of
censorship in smoking ruin. Theoretically, two valid governmental interests remain. First, the state may protect adolesContra, State v. Reese, 222 So. 2d 732, 736 (Fla. 1969).
394 U.S. at 566.
-6 Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions
of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46
Mnvn. L. REV. 1009, 1032, 1034 (1962) is the leading critical
analysis of empirical studies on this subject.
47 394 U.S. at 567.
4s Id. at 567.
49 Id. at 568.
44
46
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cents from erotica, since obscenity may reasonably be more
harmful to children because of their intellectual and emotional immaturity.50 And, second, the state may protect unwilling adults from the chagrin and revulsion that usually
accompanies exposure to obscenity. 51 However, in the absence
of these two dangers, the power of a state to censor obscenity
is of questionable validity. In other words, the state may
regulate but not prohibit the flow of obscenity in the community.
Hopefully, Stanley indicates the Court is mustering the
courage it will take to lift the dead and heavy hand of Roth
from the first amendment. However, those who sincerely
mourn the possible demise of Roth should be reminded that
the real issue behind anti-obscenity legislation is not the social
importance of the speech in question but the proper relationship between man and state. "The door barring federal and
state intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar; it must be
kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important interests."52 In the final analysis, the only effective censor is the
individual himself.
Van N. Eden
50 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
51 Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
52 394 U.S. at 563, quoting, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 488 (1957).
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